But I think that we have sufficiently discussed this topic of whether it is disgraceful to be outdone in benefits. Whoever raises the question must know that men are not in the habit of bestowing benefits upon themselves; for it would have been evident that there is no disgrace in a man’s being outdone by himself. Yet among certain Stoics it is even debated whether it is possible for a man to bestow a benefit on himself, whether it is his duty to return gratitude to himself. The reason why it seemed necessary to raise the question was our habitual use of such expressions as: “I am thankful to myself,” “I can blame no one but myself,” “I am angry with myself,” “I shall exact punishment from myself,” “I hate myself” and, many others of the same sort in which one speaks of oneself as if another person. “If,” they say, “I am able to injure myself, why should I not be able, also to bestow a benefit on myself? Moreover, why should not things that would be called benefits if I had bestowed them on another still be benefits if I have bestowed them on myself? Why should not something that would have placed me in debt if I had received it from another still place me in debt if I have given it to myself? Why should I be ungrateful to myself, which is just as disgraceful as to be niggardly to oneself and harsh and cruel to oneself and neglectful of oneself? The reputation of a pimp is equally bad whether he prostitutes himself or another. The flatterer, the man who subscribes to the words of another, and is ready to applaud falsehoods, is of course open to censure; and not less so is the man who is pleased with himself, who, so to speak, looks up to himself, and is his own flatterer. The vices are hateful, not only when they are outwardly expressed, but when they are turned in upon themselves. Whom will you more admire than the man who governs himself, who has himself under control? It is easier to rule savage nations, impatient as they are of the authority of others, than to restrain one’s own spirit and submit to self-control. Plato, say they, was grateful to Socrates because he learned from him; why should not Socrates be grateful to himself because he taught himself? Marcus Cato says: ‘Borrow from yourself whatever you lack.’ If I am able to lend to myself, why should I not be able to give to myself? The instances in which habit leads us to divide ourselves into two persons are countless; we are prone to say: ‘Let me converse with myself,’ and, ‘I will give my ear a twitch.’6 If there is any truth in these expressions, just as a man ought to be angry with himself, so he ought to render thanks to himself; as he ought to reprove himself, so also he ought to praise himself; as he can cause himself loss, so also he can bring himself gain. Injury and benefit are the converse of each other; if we say of anyone: ‘He has done himself an injury,’ we may also say: ‘He has bestowed upon himself a benefit.’